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In tro d u c tio n
In 1959 Seymour M. Lipset published an article that was to be a chapter in 
his famous book in 1960. He argued that the working class was more likely 
than the middle and upper classes to favour the ideology of anti-democratic 
movements. His study became a classic and an expanded edition was pub­
lished in 1981.
His statements caused a great deal of controversy in the social and political 
sciences. The controversy resulted not only from the relatively complex 
nature of Lipset's loosely formulated theory but also from the lack of valid 
data to test it thoroughly. Lipset and his successors had to turn to data that 
were originally not collected to test his theory. Consequently, they ended up 
testing certain fragments of the theory while ignoring several other important 
parts of it.
We shall first conscientiously outline Lipset's original theoretical model. 
Next, we shall discuss the limitations and omissions of previous empirical 
studies on so'cial class and authoritarianism. Then we shall test the core theory 
using data from a 1985 national Dutch survey.
L ip se t’s theoretica l model
The ideo logy  o f  the working class
Lipset first presented his theory at the 1955 conference on ‘The Future of 
Liberty' in Milan, Italy. Those were the days of the Cold War. In the United 
States, Senator Joseph McCarthy instigated a witch hunt for alleged com ­
munists. The Western democratic world feared aggressive expansionism of 
the communist Soviet Union. The Korean War was considered evidence of 
the international communist conspiracy to eventually dominate the whole 
world. These anti-communist sentiments also promoted U.S. involvement in 
the Vietnam War (Calvocoressi, 1982). Within this political atmosphere,
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Lipset ( 1959: 483; 1960: 99) stated that ‘The threat of freedom posed by the 
Communist movement is as great as that once posed by Fascism and Nazism, 
and Communism ... is supported mainly by the lower levels of the working 
class'. He considered this view still accurate in 1981 (cf. Lipset 1981: 89).
Lipset (1981: 92) surmised that two ideological elements prevailed ‘in the 
poorer strata everyw here '1. The first element was a complex of attitudes he9
referred to as economic l i b e r a l i s m i.e., the opinion that income, status, and 
power should be redistributed more equally in society, that government 
policies to establish this redistribution were desirable, that the government 
should introduce a graduated tax system, and that trade unions should become 
more powerful. The second element was another complex of attitudes that 
could be labelled non-econom ic con serva tism , including the opinion that civil 
liberties ought to be restricted in general and for deviant groups in particular, 
that government policies should be anti-internationalistic and pro-national­
istic, and that the government should conduct a restrictive immigration 
policy. But his data to test this hypothesis were rather poor. In fact, he merely 
demonstrated that the working class was less likely to support a multi-party 
democratic system and that the working class was less tolerant with respect 
to civil liberties3. Hence, his crucial hypothesis was merely partially tested, 
as only fragmentary parts of his wide concepts were involved in the actual 
test.
The explanation o f  the working class ideo logy
Lipset proposed the concept of authoritarianism as an explanation and as an 
intermediating link between the social situation of the working class on the 
one hand and economic liberalism and non-economic conservatism on the 
other. Why?
The phenomenon of authoritarianism had been introduced by Adorno et 
al. (1950). They had described it as a personality syndrome considered to 
consist of a number of so-called sub-syndromes. The most important ones 
were: to conform rigidly to conventional norms, to submit to and identify 
with strong leaders, to reject those who violate conventional norms, to oppose 
the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded, to believe in mystical 
determinants of the individual's fate, to think in rigid categories. At one point 
Lipset was rather explicit about the concept of authoritarianism he defined 
as a set of attitudes and predispositions of individuals (1981: 92)4. But he 
hesitated strongly to consider authoritarianism a personality type. He rather 
considered it part of the unsophisticated perspective of the working class 
(1981, 108). This becomes clear if one takes into account the substantial 
affinity between the perspective of the working class as described by Lipset 
and the syndromes of authoritarianism as translated into survey statements
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by Adorno et al. ( 1950). For example, Lipset ( 1981: 115) characterized the 
working class perspective in terms of a tendency to view politics and personal 
relationships in black-and-white terms (People can be divided into two 
distinct classes: the weak and the strong); impatience with talk and discuss- 
sion (If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better 
off); readiness to follow leaders who offer a demonological interpretation of 
evil forces (What this country needs most... is a few courageous, tireless, 
devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith).
Adorno et al. had shown that authoritarianism explained the attraction to 
typical characteristics of Fascist ideology, i.e. thnic prejudice, nationalism, 
and conservatism. As Lipset perceived some of these elements to be prevalent 
in the working class, it becomes comprehensible and plausible that he 
proposed authoritarianism as an intermediating link between the social situ­
ation of the working class and their ideological preferences. But he did not 
effectively test these implicit hypotheses, certainly not in terms of multivari­
ate analysis.
The socia l situation o f  the working class
Lipset (1981, 100-107) sought to explain authoritarianism in terms of kthe 
typical social situation of lower class persons'. He speculated that their 
situation could be characterized by a number of other interrelated charac­
teristics in addition to their actual occupational position, such as a poor 
education, non-participation in societal organizations (e.g., trade unions), 
infrequent reading, economic and psychological insecurity, and authoritarian 
family patterns. Lipset added that a number of these circumstances were also 
prevalent among small businessmen. He thus suspected fleetingly that this 
social class might also be authoritarian to some degree (1981: 105). But he 
paid less attention to this phenomenon, which he referred to as the extremism
of the middle classes (1981: 131).
Why should all these characteristics contribute to authoritarianism? Lipset 
contended that these characteristics were indicative of a certain isolation from
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the dominant cultural and political values, which prevents people from 
acquiring a sophisticated and more complex view on social problems and 
their contexts. For this reason, the lower social strata were likely to prefer 
ideologies of political movements that proposed simple and quick solutions 
to complex social problems.
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Sum m ary o f  hypotheses
We derived three sets of hypotheses from the previous propositions'^. H y p o ­
thesis I A: the working class is more likely to be liberal on economic issues. 
H ypothesis IB: the working class is more likely to be conservative on 
non-economic issues. H ypothesis 2A: authoritarianism has a positive effect 
on economic liberalism. H ypothesis  2B: authoritarianism has a positive effect 
on non-economic conservatism. Authoritarianism is determined by a work­
ing-class occupational position (hypothesis 3 A),  by a middle-class occupa­
tional position (hypothesis 3B) ,  by a low educational level (hypothesis 3 C ), 
by non-participation in trade unions (hypothesis 3 D ), by infrequent reading 
(hypothesis 3 E j, by economic insecurity (hypothesis 3 F j, by psychological 
insecurity (hypothesis 3 G ), and by authoritarian family patterns (hypothesis  
3 H) b. We will set out to test these hypotheses thoroughly.
Figure I. Graphic Summary of Lipset’s Hypotheses
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Figure 1 presents a graphic summary of these hypotheses as a path model. 
Unfortunately, we were not able to test hypotheses regarding two concepts 
of Lipset's theoretical model: on psychological insecurity (hypothesis 3G) 
and on authoritarian family patterns (hypothesis 3H). That is why these 
hypotheses are in parentheses in Figure 1.
Limitations and omissions of previous research
We compiled an overview of previous research on working-class authorita­
rianism, presented in Appendix 1. This previous research is limited in at least 
three respects.
First, past research was confined to the explanation of conservative atti­
tudes on non-economic issues, like restrictions on civil liberties, intolerance 
of protests and demonstrations, nationalism, and unfavourable attitudes to­
wards ethnic and racial outgroups. Only a few studies incorporated attitudes 
pertaining to economic liberalism (Felling and Peters, 1986; De Witte, 1990). 
Hence, L ipset’s hypothesis that the working class favoured economic lib­
eralism and non-economic conservatism simultaneously has seldom been 
tested.
Second, none of the researchers made a distinction between authoritarian­
ism as a syndrome of personality traits and the ideological elements favoured 
by authoritarian people. Consequently, Lipset's hypothesis of authoritarian­
ism affecting both economic liberalism and non-economic conservatism has 
in fact never been tested.
Third, none of the studies conducted so far examined whether all of the 
characteristics Lipset assumed to be typical of the lower class situation would 
contribute to the explanation of authoritarianism. Past empirical research 
examined, next to socioeconomic class position, only education or income as 
predictor variables of authoritarianism. Exceptional cases are the studies of 
Dekker and Ester (1986, 1987) and Middendorp and Meloen (1989), which 
also incorporated respondents' subjective class position. Hence, Lipset's 
hypothesis that authoritarianism is affected by a low socioeconomic position, 
a poor educational level, non-participation in trade unions, infrequent read­
ing, economic and psychological insecurity, and authoritarian family patterns 
has never been completely investigated by way of multivariate analysis.
In addition to these empirical omissions, it should be noted that virtually 
all the studies not only employed ill-defined but also different and therefore 
non-comparable indicators of socioeconomic class. Until 1980, most re­
searchers in this tradition used a simple working versus middle-class dicho­
tomy. These studies concluded that working-class people were more authori­
tarian than middle-class people, with the understanding that education 
reduced class differences in authoritarianism. Inspired by W right’s (1979)
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stratification theory, Grabb (1980b) was the first researcher to utilize a 
refined typology of socioeconomic class, based on the criteria of control over 
the means of production (self-employed versus wage dependent) and the 
authority over the labour of others. Dekker and Ester ( 1986, 1987), who used 
a revised version of W right's ( 1985) class scheme, showed that it was not the 
members of the working class but small proprietors who were the most 
authoritarian, which was confirmed by Middendorp and Meloen (1989). 
Taking account of these results, it might be speculated that the definition of 
socioeconomic class employed by researchers determined to some extent 
their empirical findings. Studies using a gross measure of working versus 
middle class found the former to be more authoritarian, whereas more 
elaborate class typologies refuted this finding. Moreover, Dekker and Ester 
( 1987) pointed out that in this line of research, hardly any serious consider­
ation has been given to the operationalization of socioeconomic class. Hence, 
empirical research on working-class authoritarianism is likely to benefit from 
the inclusion of a measure of socioeconomic class that is based on sociologi­
cal theory, well-defined, reliable and suited for cross-national comparison.
Data and measurements
Data were taken from the national Dutch survey ‘Social and cultural devel­
opments in the Netherlands’ conducted in the autumn of 1985. These data 
resulted from a two-stage random sample. In the first stage, a number of 
municipalities were selected in such a way that the distribution of regions 
(North, East, South and West) and the degree of urbanisation (ranging from 
small villages to big cities) would be represented proportionately to the 
national distribution. In the second stage, people aged from 18 up to 69 were 
randomly selected from the registers of the selected municipalities. About 56 
per cent of the respondents approached were willing to be interviewed 
(n=3003). This sample turned out to be representative of the Dutch population 
regarding sex, age and marital status as well as the combination of these 
characteristics. Readers who wish further information on the survey design 
and sample are encouraged to consult the documentation of Felling et al.
(1987:9-10).
There were two main questionnaires in this survey. In a first interview, 
questionnaire A was randomly submitted to about half of the respondents, 
the A-respondents (n=1520). These respondents were questioned on themes 
like family and education. Questionnaire B was submitted to the other 
randomly selected half of the respondents, the B-respondents (n=1483). 
These respondents were questioned on the theme under consideration. Then 
there were two complementary questionnaires submitted to respondents in a 
second interview, approximately one week later. A number of randomly
selected A-respondents were approached to fill in questions taken from the 
original B-questionnaire (n=309) and a number of randomly selected B-re- 
spondents were asked to fill in questions taken from the original A-question- 
naire (n=316). So we ended up with 1799 respondents questioned on auth­
oritarianism (Felling et al. 1987: 2-7). In this research we only included 
respondents who had no missing values on any of the variables employed and 
who were in the labour force, because Lipset's theory only pertains to these 
people.
To cover econom ic liberalism  three scales were used, presented in Appendix
3. The first scale encompassed a set of three items on the desirability of 
reducing status and income inequalities. It was constructed by probabilistic 
scalogram analysis (H=.54; rho=.74). The other two measurements were 
additive scales. One combined the responses to two items dealing with the 
desirability of government intervention to reduce income inequalities (Cron- 
bach 's alpha=.48) and the other scale contained two items on the desirability 
of tougher trade union policies (Cronbach’s alpha=.58).
N on-econom ic conservatism  was measured by three scales, presented in 
Appendix 2. The first scale was constructed by a probabilistic scalogram 
analysis (Mokken, 1970) of six items that measured the extent to which 
respondents felt that civil liberties ought to be granted to individuals or 
restricted. These items were found to yield a unidimensional scale (H=.47; 
rho=.74). The remaining two scales consisted of a set of eight Likert items 
measuring a favourable attitude towards the national Dutch ingroup (Cron- 
bach 's alpha=.81), and a set of ten Likert items covering an unfavourable 
attitude towards Holland's ethnic minorities (Cronbach's alpha=.91). Both 
scales appeared to be related strongly (Pearson r is .58). This classic phe­
nomenon is referred to as ethnocentrism (Sumner, 1906; Scheepers et al.,
1990). Both scales were constructed by a principal axis extraction technique 
(SPSS ', PA2). The construction of these scales has been previously do­
cumented (Scheepers et al. 1989, 1990).
Although these measurements of both ideological dimensions may be not 
exhaustive, we feel that we have covered the core elements mentioned by 
Lipset. But do these elements constitute empirically consistent dimensions? 
To answer this question, the three scales of economic liberalism and the three 
scales of non-economic conservatism were submitted to a factor analysis. An 
initial test for eigenvalues greater than one, the discontinuity in the eigenvalue 
plot (scree test), and the KMO measure of sampling adequacy suggested a 
two-factor solution. The resulting matrices were then rotated to simple 
structure. Table 1 contains a summary of the results along with the reliabilities 
of the two sets of scales.
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Table I . Factor Pattern Matrix of Economic Liberalism and Non-Economic Conservatism
Measurement Scales
Factor Pattem 
Loadings1
i
h
I II
I Economic Liberalism (Cronbach's alpha = .74)
1 Reduction of Class Differences .75 .58
2 Government Intervention in Income Differences .80 .63
3 Tougher Trade Union Policy .58 .33
II Non-Economic Conservatism (Cronbach's alpha = .71)
1 Restriction of Civil Liberties .44 .21
2 Unfavourable Attitude towards Ethnic Outgroups .82 .66
3 Favourable Attitude towards National Ingroup .80 .62
Total Percent of Explained Variance: 51.0
Factor Intercorrelation: .04
'  J
Factor pattern loadings less than .15 lire not reported.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this table. First, a cursory examination 
of the factor pattern loadings indicates that all scales have a substantial 
loading on the factor they are assumed to measure. Together with the quite 
acceptable reliabilities, this finding indicates that the scales represent two 
ideological dimensions that are relatively consistent in themselves. Second, 
the two obliquely rotated factors are virtually unrelated to each other, which 
confirms previous findings of Felling and Peters ( 1986) and De Witte ( 1990), 
although they used slightly different indicators of both dimensions.
Authoritarianism  was conceptualized by Adorno et al. ( 1950) as consisting 
of nine sub-syndromes, i.e. authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggres­
sion, conventionalism, projectivity, anti-intraception, superstition and stere- 
otypy, power and toughness, destructiveness and cynicism, and exaggerated 
concern with sexuality. Each of these was measured by a single original 
F-scale item derived from Adorno et al. (1950), presented in Appendix 4 7. 
Factor analysis of the items yielded a one-factorial solution (Cronbach 's 
alpha=.78). The factor appeared to have quite acceptable properties in terms 
of the explained variance, the items' communalities and factor pattern load­
ings, except for the item incorporated to measure projectivity. This item was 
therefore excluded from the final scale.
The operationalization of socioeconomic class was derived from Erikson 
et al. (1979, 1983). Each respondent was categorized into one of ten nominal 
occupational categories according to four criteria, namely labour sector, 
required skills, self-employed versus wage-dependent, and authority over the 
labour of others. This classification was designed for cross-national compari­
sons and has already been applied in 35 countries all over the world (Ganze-
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boom, Luykx and Treiman, 1989). Moreover, in the Netherlands it has been 
shown to be a better predictor of various social attitudes than socioeconomic 
status variables like occupational prestige, controlling for other predictors 
like education, age and income (Kraaykamp et al., 1989). Table 2 shows the 
resulting class categories with labels adopted from cross-national research 
(Ganzeboom et al., 1989).
Education  was measured by the respondent's highest educational attain­
ment. The seven-point scale ranges from primary school to university. To 
measure non-participation in trade unions , respondents were asked whether 
or not they were a member of a trade union. Infrequent reading  was measured 
by asking respondents whether or not they read a regional or national 
newspaper every day.
To measure economic insecurity , two indicators were utilized, i.e. status- 
anxiety and socioeconomic frustration, presented in Appendix 6 . The status- 
anxiety scale was constructed by a probabilistic scalogram analysis (H=.39; 
rho=.76) of six items revealing the respondent's insecurity with respect to 
his/her social prestige and financial prospects. The socioeconomic frustration 
scale consisted of two items (Cronbach's a lpha= .51 ).
Analysis and results
For descriptive purposes we performed three separate oneway analyses of 
variance to assess the bivariate relationship between socioeconomic class and 
authoritarianism, economic liberalism or non-economic conservatism. Table
2 contains mean factor scores per class category (grand mean is 500, standard 
deviation is 100).
Table 2. Mean Factor scores of Class Categories on Authoritarianism, Economic Lib- 
eralism and Non-Economic Conservatism
Numbers
per
category
Authorita­
rianism
Economic
Liber­
alism
Non-
Economic
Conservatism
Higher Controllers
C r  \
97 477.37 442.66 484.68
Lower Controllers 213 443.98 486.18 434.5 1
Routine Non-Manual Workers 2 12 474.87 492.06 485.68
Small Proprietors with Employees 24 468.63 437.83 555.17
Small Proprietors without Employees 21 502.38 498.05 520.00
Farmers 20 547.10 434.80 546.65
Supervisors o f  Manual Workers 27 526.89 490.89 528.51
Skilled Manual Workers 52 491.58 528.33 516.40
Semi- and Unskilled Manual Workers 140 518.16 534.98 527.70
Agricultural Workers 9 513.78 505.00 546.77
F-Ratio 11.38 8.29 16.00
P .00 .00 .00
1 12
To examine the hypotheses presented in Figure 1, multiple regression ana­
lyses were applied to two equations with economic liberalism and non-econ­
omic conservatism as the dependent variables and all the other variables as 
predictors and to one equation with authoritarianism as the dependent vari­
able and all the others, except economic liberalism and non-economic con­
servatism, as predictors. Since socioeconomic class, non-participation in 
trade unions, and infrequent reading are nominal variables, we constructed 
dummy variables for the categories of each of these variables. Of each of 
these variables, one category was omitted as a reference category. We chose 
the reference categories in such a way that we could conclude directly 
whether the working class, people who do not participate in trade unions, and 
people who do not read newspapers are more strongly authoritarian, liberal 
on economic issues and conservative on non-economic issues than their 
antipodes, controlling for other predictors in the model.
We checked whether or not assumptions of regression analysis (like
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linearity, additivity1, homoscedasticity and lack of inulticollinearity , were 
disproved by the data. As these assumptions were not refuted, we proceeded 
with the estimation of the equations.
Table 3 presents the estimated regression coefficients. In the upper part of 
this table there are only unstandardized regression coefficients of the dummy 
variables, as standardized coefficients for dummies make no sense. In the 
lower part of Table 3 there are both unstandardized and standardized (in 
parentheses) regression coefficients of education, status anxiety, socioecon­
omic frustration, and authoritarianism.
Hypothesis 1A states that the working class is liberal on economic issues. It 
appears from the bivariate analysis (Table 2) as well as from the multivariate 
analysis (Table 3) that skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers are 
the most liberal people on economic issues. Hence, hypothesis IA  is sup­
ported by the data. It also appears that the classes of lower controllers and 
routine non-manual workers are fairly liberal in this respect (Table 3). 
Hypothesis 1B states that the working class is conservative on non-economic 
issues. It appears from Table 2 that this hypothesis can not be rejected on a 
bivariate basis. But from Table 3 we can conclude that preference for this 
ideology is not due to belonging to the working class as such. In fact there 
are hardly any differences between the social classes. Only the class of lower 
controllers is significantly less conservative than the reference category, 
controlling for the other predictor variables10. Hence, the working classes can 
not be considered less tolerant of civil liberties, more prejudiced against 
outgroups or more nationalistic or anti-internationalistic. This means that 
hypothesis IB  is refuted by our data.
Having ascertained that belonging to the workiim class as such does not
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Table 3. Regression of Authoritarianism, Economic Liberalism, and Non-Economic Conser­
vatism on Social Class Dummy Variables and Other Predictor Variables: Unstandardized and 
(Standardized) Regression Coefficients (N=815)
Independent Variables
Dependent Variables
Authorita- Economic
rianism Liber­
alism
Non-
Economic
Conser­
vatism
Intercept
Socioeconomic Class Dummies11
524.17 483.82 229.77
Lower Controllers -33.05 * 37.85* -28.58*
Routine Non-Manual Workers -24.68 * 40.61 * -3.48
Small Proprietors with Employees 74.97* -1.69* 10.77
Small Proprietors without Employees -.3.82 40.87 15.41
Farmers 38.66 -15.50 12.99
Supervisors of Manual Workers 16.40 37.72 6.71
Skilled Manual Workers -27.96 67.69 * 13.68
Semi- and Unskilled Manual Workers -2.43 78.14* 7.84
Agricultural Workers 12.72 48.33 2 1.43
Nonmember of Trade Unions 10.11 -15.57* 12.29 *
Read No Newspapers 1.84 29.85 * 13.47
Education -16.22* -5.57* -4.72*
(-.28)* (-.09)* (-.08)*
Status anxiety 2.76 8.19* -1.43
(.04) (.13)* (-.0 2 )
Socioeconomic Frustration 6 .2 0 * 2.74 -.32
( .11)* (.04) (-.0 1 )
Authoritarianism 0 - . 1 0 * .60*
0 ( - .10)* (.60)*
9
Adjusted R“ .18 .1 1 .49
a The class of higher controllers is the reference category (n=97) 
* p < .05.
0  Not entered into the regression equation.
contribute to the explanation of non-economic conservatism, hypothesis 2B 
becomes all the more interesting. This hypothesis states that authoritarianism 
positively affects non-economic conservatism directly. The effect of authori­
tarianism on non-economic conservatism is indeed positive and quite strong 
(.60), indicating that hypothesis 2B is corroborated: authoritarianism appears 
to be the main source of non-economic conservatism. Hypothesis 2A states 
that authoritarianism has a positive effect on economic liberalism. However, 
this effect appears to be negative (-.10). Hence, hypothesis 2A is rejected.
The third set of hypotheses predicts that a low occupational position and
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a middle-class position, a poor education, non-participation in trade unions, 
infrequent reading, and economic insecurity all increase authoritarianism. 
Table 3 shows that education has a significant negative effect (-.28) and that 
socioeconomic frustration has a significant positive effect ( . 11) on authori­
tarianism. These findings support hypothesis 3C  and part of hypothesis 3F. 
The effects of non-membership in trade unions, no newspaper reading, and 
status anxiety, however, do not reach significance and do not corroborate 
hypotheses 3D, 3E  and part o f  hypothesis 3F.
But the most important question in this context is whether belonging to the 
working class (hypothesis 3A) or to the middle class (hypothesis 3B) con­
tributes to the explanation of authoritarianism. Although the categories that 
could be regarded as belonging to the working class seem to be authoritarian 
in Table 2 on a bivariate basis, it appears from Table 3 that none of these 
categories differs from the reference category, controlling for other predic­
tors. Hence, hypothesis 3A is rejected: the extent of authoritarianism in the 
working class is not due to their socioeconomic position as such but due to 
related circumstances. We can safely conclude however that hypothesis 3B 
is supported by our data, as the degree of authoritarianism of small proprietors 
with employees is striking (in Tables 2 and 3): this category differs signifi­
cantly from the reference category and is by far the most authoritarian11. 
There are also significant differences between lower controllers and routinecr
non-manual workers and the reference category: the former categories are 
significantly less authoritarian.
Finally, some findings concerning economic liberalism and non-economic 
conservatism may be noted here. Table 3 shows that education has a negative, 
albeit weak, effect on both economic liberalism and non-economic conser­
vatism. Status anxiety appears to have only a positive effect on economic 
liberalism. With respect to the participation in trade unions, non-members 
are found to be less liberal on economic issues but more conservative 
regarding non-economic issues than the reference category. Newspaper 
reading has no effect on non-economic conservatism. People who do not read 
newspapers, however, appear to be more economically liberal than those who 
do.
Conclusions and discussion
Our results show that Lipset's core theoretical model was refuted on some 
aspects but corroborated on others.
First, it appeared that the working class, i.e., the class of unskilled and 
skilled manual workers, was indeed more in favour of economic liberalism 
(hypothesis I A). This also held true of lower controllers and routine non-ma- 
nual workers. They all desire smaller income inequalities, government inter­
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vention to reduce these inequalities, and a tougher trade union policy. We 
consider this result quite plausible, since economic liberalism could serve the 
interests of these classes: they would probably benefit from a government 
that put these liberal views into practice. The working class also seemed to 
favour non-economic conservatism as indicated by restrictions on civil 
liberties, anti-outgroups and pro-nationalistic attitudes, as was surmised by 
Lipset (hypothesis IB). But we rejected this hypothesis: the fact that the 
working class subscribes to this ideology is not due to their class position as 
such. In fact, we ascertained merely minor differences between social classes 
regarding non-economic conservatism. This finding may be interpreted in the 
framework of the Dutch political climate where democratic values are widely 
shared, regardless of one 's  position in society.
Second, authoritarianism did not appear to have a positive effect on 
economic liberalism as surmised by Lipset (hypothesis 2/4), but a negative 
albeit weak effect. This means that authoritarian individuals oppose trade 
unions and economic interventions by the government, which implies that 
they favour a laissez-faire economy. Next, authoritarianism had a rather 
strong positive effect on non-economic conservatism, in conformity with 
Lipset's theory (hypothesis 2B). This means that authoritarianism still ap­
pears to be a major source of pro-nationalistic, anti-outgroups and anti-demo­
cratic attitudes, as was discovered by Adorno et al. in 1950. As this has been 
ascertained so often -  Felling et al. (1986) mentioned 35 studies world-wide 
-  it may be considered one of the persistent patterns in the social sciences.
Third, having ascertained that authoritarianism still is a major source of 
anti-democratic attitudes, it is relevant to note that authoritarianism was not 
induced by belonging to the working class as such, as was surmised by Lipset 
(hypothesis 3 A). This means that the working class in the Netherlands is not 
the social basis for anti-democratic sentiments. Instead, the results indicated 
that the highest levels of authoritarianism are found within the class of smallc
proprietors with employees (hypothesis 3B). This finding may be interpreted 
as a second persistent pattern: it was the lower middle class that was rather 
active in the Nazi Party from the twenties on to the end of World War II, as 
was ascertained by Kater (1983, 264), based on exhaustive studies of Nazi 
archives. Why is this class of small proprietors with employees more auth­
oritarian? There is no clear-cut answer to this question. We suspect that one 
answer could be derived from the intrinsic aspects of their class position. 
Their position is in between: taking orders from customers, who have to be 
treated as authorities, and giving orders to subordinates. It may be argued that 
this class position moulds people who are willing to submit to authorities but 
have a simultaneous need to subject others to their own authority. These are 
precisely the core characteristics of authoritarianism.
Fourth, predictors like non-membership in trade unions (hypothesis 3D)
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and infrequent reading of newspapers (hypothesis 3E)  did not contribute to 
the explanation of authoritarianism. Apparently, these conditions do not 
necessarily induce authoritarianism, possibly because nowadays there are 
mass media through which one can acquire a more sophisticated view. And 
it appeared that the fear of losing status also did not contribute to authorita­
rianism whereas having experienced severe financial losses did induce auth­
oritarianism just as feelings of socioeconomic frustration indeed affected 
authoritarianism, as put forward by Lipset (hypothesis 3 F ).
Fifth, we found that authoritarianism indeed prevailed on the low educa­
tional lèvels (hypothesis 3C). There is abundant empirical evidence on this 
finding as well as sophisticated interpretations. In fact, L ipset’s interpretation 
of authoritarianism as an unsophisticated world view was elaborated by 
Gabennesch (1972). He stated that authoritarianism reflects a simplistic 
world view, a narrow breadth of perspective, which is typical of people who 
lack the abilities for more complex points of view. And this world view, in 
turn, accounts for anti-democratic attitudes in general, according to G aben­
nesch. This interpretation is supported by our data as it appeared that the 
effect of education on conservative attitudes regarding non-economic issues 
is strongly mediated by authoritarianism. This interpretation was recently 
supported more directly by the empirical findings of Bobo and Licari (1989). 
They found that the effect of education on political (in)tolerance was strongly 
mediated by cognitive sophistication. Now, in view of these parallel results, 
we would conclude that Lipset's interpretation of authoritarianism as an 
unsophisticated world view is basically not refuted.
The effects of education on this type of political attitudes have been shown 
to vary across cultures (Simpson, 1972). Simpson presumed that education 
would reduce authoritarianism ‘only when the educational system em phas­
izes cognitive rather than rote learning or is manned by non-authoritarian 
teachers' ( 1972,223). Quite a different interpretation was formulated by Weil 
(1985), who hypothesized that the effects of education vary across cultures 
according to the length of time a country has had a liberal-democratic regime 
form, and the degree of religious heterogeneity. These two theories are not 
necessarily contradictory, as the educational system of a country is apt to be 
related to its regime form. But we note that the effect ascertained in our study 
occurs in a country like the Netherlands that has a long democratic history 
and a great deal of religious heterogeneity. As such, these results are consist­
ent with W eil 's  theory, that in such countries the effect of education is fairly 
strong. We feel it would be worthwhile to do cross-national research on this 
relationship in other types of countries that have shorter democratic histories 
and less religious heterogeneity.
All in all, we have demonstrated that L ipset’s theory contains some flaws, 
especially when it comes to explaining the plausibility of authoritarianism as
an intermediating link between one 's  social situation and one 's  political 
views. Yet, we consider this view valuable as authoritarianism appears to be 
the main source of anti-democratic sentiments, i.e. non-economic conservat­
ism. This element of Lipset’s theory is not refuted. But his theory is refuted 
on another crucial aspect: it is not the working class but the class of small 
proprietors with employees that is a breeding ground for anti-democratic 
sentiments.
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APPENDIX 1
Empirical studies on working-class authoritarianism
Year of  
Study
Author(s) N Scope of  
Sample
Social
Classa
1965 Lipsitz 500 U.S. M vs. W.
1967 Zeitlin 2 10 Cuba W
1971
1972
Korpi
Hamilton
4862 Sweden 
several 
U.S.samples
W, Income
several
categories
1972 Ransford 477 Los Angeles M vs.W
1975 Hopple 84 
1 19
U.S.Teachers 
U.S.Unionists
M vs. W
1979/
1980a
Grabb 1499 U.S. M vs. W,
Education,
Income
1980b Grabb 2164 U.S. Wright, 
Robinson & 
Kelley 
Education, 
Income
1982 Ray 95 Sydney M vs. W
Indicators of  
Authoritarianism
1986
1986/
1987
Felling 
and Peters
Dekker 
and Ester
100 London,
Glasgow
M vs. W
100 Johannesburg M vs. W, 
education
101 Los Angeles M vs. W
170 New South M vs. W,
Wales Education
300 Queensland M vs. W
100 Philippines M vs. W
1000 Netherlands Class
Position
4000 Netherlands Wright1^
Education
Income
Subjective
Class
Position
Original Authoritarianism 
(Adorno et al., 1950) 
Admission Civil 
Liberties 
Communist Vote 
Admission Civil 
Liberties, Attitudes 
Towards Blacks 
Admission Students 
Protest, Anti-Blacks 
Admission Protest
Admission Civil 
Liberties
Admission Civil 
Liberties
Balanced Authoritarianism 
Scale, Directiveness,
Social Desirability
Conservatism,
Directiveness
Balanced Authoritarianism
Scale
Balanced Authoritarianism 
Scale
Balanced Authoritarianism 
Scale
Balanced Authoritarianism 
Scale
Balanced Authoritarianism 
Scale
Economic Liberalism 
Non-Economic 
Conservatism 
Original authoritarianism 
Scale, Admission of  
Civil Liberties, Political 
Distrust, Admission 
Protest, Women’s Libera­
tion, Tolerance of  
Outgroups, Anomie, 
Nationalism
#A P P E N D IX  I : (continued)
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Year of Author(s) N 
Study
1989
1990 De Witte
Scope of 
Sample
Middendorp 3330 Netherlands 
and Melocn
135 Belgium
Social 
Class a
Wright
Education,
Income,
Subjective
Class
Position
Class
Position,
Education
Indicators of 
Authoritarianism
Original Authoritarianism 
Scale. Admission of Civil 
Liberties, Political 
Distrust. Admission 
Protest. Women’s libera­
tion, Tolerance of Out­
groups, Anomie. Nationa­
lism
Economic Liberalism 
Non-Economic Conserva­
tism
a M = Middle class or white collar workers, W = working class or blue collar workers, 
b The classification schemes of Wright ( 1979, 1985) and Robinson and Kelley (1979) are 
based on the following two criteria: control over the means of production (self-employed 
versus wage-dependent) and authority over the labour activity of others.
A P P E N D IX  2
Measurements on non-economic conservatism
Restrictions on civil liberties
Respondents were asked whether they felt that the civil liberties mentioned below ought to 
be restricted or granted to everybody. We report the percentage of people who felt that there 
liberties ought to be restricted (difficulty) and the association of the item with other items in 
the scale (Hi).
To say whatever one wants in public 
To write whatever one wants in public 
To demonstrate in favour or against a cause 
To criticise the Royal House in public 
To refuse military service
To occupy buildings in order to enforce justified demands
difficulty Hi
99
•  4M» .47
.29 .45
.26 .46
.46 .50
.41 .40
.72 .55
1 2 0
Etimocentrism: items, percentages, factor analysis
Unfavourable attitude towards outgroups
Frequencies (%) 
neutral 
agree disagi
9
ree h~ loadings
Foreigners who live in Holland should take
over Dutch customs. 42.8 32.0 25.2 • • •
Most Moroccans are rude people. 2.5 10.1 87.4 .45 .68 •
Holland should not have let in foreign
labourers in. 21 .8 24.3 53.9 • • •
Foreigners have all kinds of dirty smells. 7.8 16.9 75.3 .53 .74 •
Gypsies drive around in big caravans at the
expense of the National Assistance Department. 21 .6 30.0 48.4 .59 .74 •
With Moroccans you never know for certain
whether or not they are going to be aggressive. 11.3 17.5 71.2 .65 .82 •
Most people from Surinam work quite slowly. 21 .8 23.1 55.1 .53 .72 •
Gypsies are never to be trusted. 18.6 26.0 55.4 .66 .80 •
Most Turks are easy-going 10.6 22.1 67.3 .63 .80 •
People from Surinam are short-tempered. 17.2 26.2 56.6 .56 .74 •
Turks have so many children because they are
slightly backward. 15.5 21.8 62.7 .44 .66 •
When you deal with Jews, you have to be extra
careful 18.1 15.9 66 .0 .49 .67 •
Unfavourable attitude towards outgroups
Frequencies (%)
neutnil
agree disagi
/
ree h“ loadings
Everywhere in the world Dutch people are liked. 13.5 29.6 56.9 .25 • .46
We, the Dutch people, are always willing to pul
our shoulders to the wheel. 32.9 32.6 34.5 .38 • .62
Generally speaking, Holland is a better country
than most other countries. 49.0 23.4 27.6 .26 • .51
We, the Dutch people, have reason to be proud
of our history. 37.6 32.7 29.7 .50 • .71
Other countries can learn a lot of good things
from our count 17. 29.6 42.3 28.1 .30 • .53
We should give foreigners who want to reside
in our country a hearty welcome. 23.3 45.9 30.8 • • •
If Dutch customs were to be taken over by all other
countries, that would lead to the end o f  all wars. 7.2 17.7 75.1 • • •
Ever>' Dutchman ought to pay honour to our
national symbols like the national flag and the
national anthem. 51.8 22 .6 25.6 .34 • .57
When the striving for international co-operation, we
have to lake care that no typical Dutch customs
get lost.C r 40.8 32.0 27.2 .37 • .60
I am proud to be a Dutchman. 61.7 26.8 11.5 .51 -.1 1 .77
•
expiai ned variance = 46. 9%
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APPENDIX 3
Measurements on economic liberalism
Desirability o f  income and status equalization
The items below were used to measure the extent to which respondents favoured the equali 
zation o f  social inequalities. We present the percentage of people who agree with the items 
(difficulty) and the association of the item with other items in the scale (Hi).
Difficulty Hi
The differences between classes ought to be smaller than
they are at present. .83 .55
The differences between high and low incomes should be
smaller. .62 .62
Workers still have to struggle for an equal position in society .83 .46
Desirability o f  government intervention
We present the percentage of respondents who agreed with the items below.
1 am in favour of government intervention to reduce 
income differences. .61
The government has to oblige enterprises to share the profit
between employers and shareholders equally. .37
Tougher trade union policies
Trade unions have to adopt a much harder line if they are to 
promote workers’ interest. .25
Trade unions have to advise their members to vote for the 
parties that promote workers’ interests best. .27
APPENDIX 4
Authoritarianism items, percentages and factor analysis (N =I520)
Frequencies (%) 
neutral
disagreeagree h“ loadings
People can be divided in two distinct classes: the 
weak and the strong. 36.9 19.2 43.9 .32 .56
Familiarity breeds contempt. 22.1 26.6 51.3 .28 .53
Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, 
but as they grow up, they ought to get over them 
and settle down. 34.5 26.7 38.8 .38 .62
Most of our social problems would be solved if 
we could somehow get rid o f  immoral, 
crooked and feeble-minded people. 17.4 17.3 65.3 .31 .56
What this country needs most, more than laws 
and political programmes, is a few courageous, 
fearless, devoted leaders people 
can put their faith in. 37.0 23.7 39.3 .38 .62
A person who has bad manners, habits and breeding 
can hardly expect to get along with decent people. 42.3 30.0 27.7 .26 .51
Nowadays more and more people are prying into 
matters that should remain personal and private. 46.9 25.3 27.8 • •
Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, 
deserve more than mere imprisonment: these 
criminals ought to be whipped publicly, or worse. 38.4 19.7 41.9 .30 .55
If people would talk less and work harder, every­
body would be better off. 35.5 27.1 37.4 .37 .61
explained variance = 32.5%
#APPENDIX 5
Status anxiety and socioeconomic frustration
The items below were used to measure status anxiety. We present the percentage of the 
people who agreed with the questions (difficulty) and the association of the item with other 
items in the scale (Hi).
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Difficulty Hi
Are you never afraid that your present situation will 
get worse in the near future? .53 .41
Do you think you w on’t be able to afford as much 
luxury as you have now in the near future? .53 .41
Do you think you will have to curtail your housekeeping 
money in the near future?
OC
• .47
Are you ever worried about the possibility that people of  
lower status will come to live in your street? .10 .37
Are you ever worried about the possibility that the status 
of your neighbourhood will decline? .20 .30
Are you never worried that you will have to change 
your lifestyle? .36 .30
The items below were combined to measure socioeconomic frustration. After the answers
are the percentual frequencies of the people who gave the answer.
Please compare your contemporary situation with the situation of five years ago. In what
way has the income before taxes of the household you belong to changed?
(strongly ) decreased 38.1
stayed the same 25.8
(strongly) increased 36.1
Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your present income?
(very) dissatisfied 17.1
neutral 20 .0
(very) satisfied 62.8
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NOTES
1. It is quite confusing that Lipset used several terms to refer to the categories where these 
ideological elements were prevalent, like: the poorer strata, the working class, the lower 
levels of the working class, the lower classes, the lower strata and lower status groups. 
We will consistently use the term working class: to refer to people employed to perform 
manual labor.
2. The meaning of this concept may be quite confusing to European readers, because it has 
different meanings in different countries. In the context, of the United States, ‘liberalism' 
refers to the opposite of conservatism. In England, ‘liberalism’ is often referred to as 
radicalism. And in the Netherlands, the concept of ‘liberalism’ is best referred to as 
‘progressiveness’. Hence, in the Netherlands, liberalism does not refer to the ideology of  
the classic liberal party (V.V.D.).
3. Other evidence for his thesis included the tough-mindedness of the working class as 
ascertained by Eysenck ( 1954) and to authoritarianism of the working class derived from 
Adorno et al. (1950) and successive studies.
4. What is confusing is that Lipset used authoritarianism to also refer to an extensive set of  
partly inconsistent social and political attitudes and values, e.g., anti-democratic senti­
ments, traditionalism, conservatism, and communism.
5. In addition to these hypotheses we mention, for the sake of completeness, another 
hypothesis developed by Lipset. He argued that members of the working class were also 
likely to convert to fundamentalistic and dogmatic religious movements. Taking the 
marginality of these religious movements in present-day Holland into account, however, 
this thesis was considered irrelevant to the present study.
6 . Recently two other predictors o f  authoritarianism were discovered: church involvement 
and age (Scheepers et al., 1990: 21 -23). We chose not to add these predictors to the model 
for two reasons. First, our primary aim was to test Lipset's original theory without any 
additional elements because this theory is complicated enough as it is. Second, these 
predictors are not necessarily related to Lipset's argument that authoritarianism could be 
explained by indicators of isolation from the dominant political values.
7. These items have been under suspicion of acquiescent response set since the appearance 
of the study by Christie and Jahoda ( 1954). Yet, others have found reasons to doubt it 
(Rorer, 1965: Meloen et al., 1988). We inserted these items in the questionnaire so as to 
avoid or at least reduce acquiescence by alternating them with items dealing with other 
substantial themes.
8 . The possibility of non-additivity, hence of interaction between education and authorita­
rianism on non-economic conservatism as found by Hesselbart and Schuman ( 1976) was 
checked by adding a multiplicative term containing both original variables to the equation 
as proposed by Friedrich ( 1982). We ruled out this possibility by ascertaining that this 
multiplicative term did not reach significance (p. < 05).
9. The possibility of multicollinearity between some independent variables is ruled out by 
the relatively low associations between these variables: the highest association is the one 
between social class and education (Cramers V=.28).
10. Tests on Least Significant Differences (for multiple comparisons of pairs of means, which 
are not extensively presented here) revealed that this class differed significantly (p. < 05) 
from all other classes in this respect.
11. L.S.D.-tests revealed that the class of small proprietors with employees was significantly 
(p. < 05) more authoritarian than all other classes, except for the class of farmers, which 
resembles the small proprietors.
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